externalities. Thus the role of the government as a guarantor of civil and political rights, "valued mainly on noninstrumental grounds," 3 or as an implementer of social equity objectives, is kept in the background, though one may also view the provision of rights or of equity as instrumental concerns, and therefore akin to public goods in nature.
As an organizing principle, the analysis of governance here has three dimensions: (1) the degree of commitment or durability of laws and rules, (2) the degree of enforcement of these laws, and (3) the degree of decentralization of jurisdictions with respect to providing public goods. This is not a perfect or complete categorization, 4 but still a useful one. Each of these dimensions is examined in turn, prefaced with a review of the literature on governance and economic performance, particularly with respect to India. The purpose of the analysis that follows this review is to identify, in India's case, aspects of particular dimensions of governance that may have had adverse consequences for economic efficiency. This analysis is meant to suggest a conceptual framework for empirical work, rather than providing definitive empirical answers. The article concludes with an overall assessment, including a consideration of collective action in general, as well as alternative structures of institutions of governance.
to develop mathematical models of this link, and to provide empirical methods to test them.
The mathematical models provide greater precision in terms of causal effects. For example, Rivera-Batiz analyzes the impact of democracy on the quality of governance, which is the level of corruption in his model, and how that, in turn, affects growth. Gradstein, in an analysis close to North's arguments, examines the impact of enforceability of property rights on growth. There are many similar models, all of which involve considerable abstraction and simplification. 6 Note that enforceability, absence of corruption, and so on can be considered to be public (non-rival) goods from an economist's perspective.
Empirical analyses typically look at cross-country data, formalizing, in a sense, historians' case study comparisons. In order to conduct such analyses, various data sets have been constructed, attempting to capture different dimensions of governance. Tables 1-3 summarize three of these data sets. The measure in Table 1 is the easiest to understand, since it is a narrow measure of political rights and civil liberties, qualities one broadly associates with democracy. Table 2 reports six different indices of governance, representing different "clusters." One interesting point is that these clusters combine structure, conduct, and performance of institutions of governance. Most of the indices are self-explanatory, though government effectiveness may be elucidated further. According to Kaufman, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, it combines assessments of the "quality of public service provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the independence of the civil service from political pressures, and the credibility of the government's commitment to policies." Finally, the index in Table 3 , "government antidiversion policy," or GADP, combines five measures: bureaucratic quality, law and order, risk of appropriation, corruption, and government repudiation of contracts. The GADP Cross-country regressions, unsurprisingly, tend to find quite strong positive links between governance and growth, with much of these results being driven, perhaps, by differences between developing and developed countries. For example, Table 1 reports India's scores, which are typically much lower than the United States. On the other hand, they are not dissimilar to China's ratings. Comparisons within similar groups of countries are therefore harder to make using such data: for example, China's economic performance in the last twenty years has outstripped India's, but only in stability and effectiveness does its governance seem to rate higher. While this suggests that a detailed comparison of India and China would be useful, it is beyond the scope of this article. However, the point remains valid that a consideration of a country's governance institutions within a conceptual framework may give pointers toward their impact on economic performance. Just as India is not the worst country in terms of governance measures, it has also been a reasonable performer in terms of economic growth. From independence in 1947 through the 1970s, India's economic growth was reasonable, averaging 3.75% per year, though not rapid enough to significantly diminish the number of poor people. Changes in economic policies, starting in the 1980s, but especially in the 1990s, seem to be associated with India moving to a more satisfactory range of 5-7% annual growth. One might argue that further economic reform will push this rate still higher. However, there is a case to be made that further economic reform itself is intertwined with improved governance, along the different dimensions indicated in Tables 1-3 .
The empirical indices attempt to combine many different facets of governance, which may themselves interact, as Rivera-Batiz argues. In particular, they combine aspects of governance structures with the conduct and performance of government. Abstract theoretical models are somewhat clearer, focusing on deadweight losses through what Bhagwati has called Directly Unproductive (DUP) activities (including corruption and rent-seeking), 7 and on uncertainties in governance that inhibit private investment. In subsequent sections of the article, our focus on durability, enforceability, and decentralization examines these aspects of governance structure for India, and how they feed into the conduct and performance of government, and ultimately of the economy as a whole.
Durability
By their nature, laws are meant to be somewhat durable, that is, to last for some time. In practice, of course, informal social norms may have greater durability. Here we focus on codified laws, whether written down in statutes and regulations, or established by formal judicial precedents. Within this category, there may deliberately be different degrees of durability. Constitutions are obviously meant to be more durable than other laws, being made relatively difficult to amend. Within a particular constitutional framework, specific laws may be changed more easily, by legislative action. Administrative rules and ordinances are the least durable. The durability of judicial precedents 120 India Review is less clear, depending on the actual workings of the judicial system. Ideally, we would expect precedents to make the interpretation of laws more durable than simple administrative procedures. To some extent this issue also overlaps with that of enforceability, and we return to it in the next section.
Rationale
The rationale for durability is twofold, involving the economist's usual dichotomy of equity and efficiency. The kind of durability built into constitutions involves both; there are protections for individual and group rights (as in the case of India and many other countries) against future attack. This may be justified on ethical grounds, and rooted in equity considerations. Provisions to protect property rights, such as requiring government compensation for takings, may be seen as enhancing efficiency by reducing investment-inhibiting uncertainty. 8 In practice, any constitutional aspect can have implications for both equity and efficiency. For example, protecting some minority rights may be necessary for their acceptance of the constitution, avoiding either a less efficient country composition without the minority, or the costs of future conflict if minority concerns are ignored. Or, in the case of protection for private property, these may be seen in terms of fairness, and a particular attitude towards the status quo distribution of property. Thus equity and efficiency considerations are not separable in practice.
The efficiency rationale for durability may also be seen in terms of the benefits of precommitment (i.e., the ability to publicly stick to some predetermined course of action) to avoid the problem of "time inconsistency." 9 This term refers to the problem that a government or other economic actor may announce a policy, but then have incentives to modify it once others have responded to it. If all future possibilities can be anticipated, having precommitment now will be better than not having it. If some outcomes will involve renegotiation of contracts, laws, rules, or agreements, this, too, can be anticipated now, and some degree of flexibility, by allowing renegotiation, may improve efficiency for some future possibilities at the expense of current, "expected" efficiency, so the option to precommit is not used. 10 If all possibilities cannot be anticipated, then precommitment is of necessity incomplete. In practice, therefore, the optimal degree of durability is impossible to prescribe in general. Perhaps the only possible, rough generalization is that there should be a tradeoff in practice between specificity of laws and their durability, as measured by the difficulty of changing them. We use this idea to examine the durability of laws in Indian experience.
Constitutions
As I have argued elsewhere, 11 India's Constitution, while avoiding the problem of being over-specific (a charge that has been made about Brazilian constitution making efforts), has been insufficiently durable, because it is too easily amended. 12 The amendment requirements, a two-thirds majority of both houses of parliament and a majority of state legislatures, 13 do not seem much weaker than those of the United States. The rate of amendment, however, has been over ten times as great (86 in 53 years, versus 27 in 214 years). 14 Before justifying the characterization of the rate of amendment as too high, it is worth looking at its connection to the underlying political situation. For example, it could be that during India's first decade as a republic, when the Indian National Congress controlled the central as well as most state governments with supermajorities, amendment would have been relatively easy-unlike the case of the 1990s, with weak coalition governments and divided rule at the state level. Table 4 summarizes the time pattern of amendments. Of course, simple enumeration tells one nothing about the relative import of various amendments. Furthermore, using decades as the unit of measure hides special circumstances (e.g., the "Emergency" in force from 1975 to 1977) and variations within decades (e.g., 1980-1989, when the Nehru-Gandhi family's Congress exercised strong control, versus 1989-1990, which saw a coalition government). Nevertheless, one can see that, even at the best of times, in terms of diffusion of political power, the structure of the amendment process has allowed for relatively frequent changes. What have been the impacts of easy amendment? Elsewhere I focused on the erosion of Kashmir's special constitutional status and its effects on the development of violent conflict in that region. 15 This is not directly an economic inefficiency, though the economic costs of such conflict have been great in the case of Kashmir. If one examines other key amendments to the Indian Constitution, many of them have tended to have greater political and distributional consequences, rather than ones of economic efficiency. In some cases, amendments have limited individual rights, or enhanced the power of the central government vis-à-vis the states. The efficiency consequences of this lack of durability are not clear. In these cases, the past and present working of the Indian economy may not have been significantly affected by the lack of constitutional durability.
In other cases, the economic impact of amendment has been more dramatic. I provide one striking example. Economic theories such as market-preserving federalism (MPF), which emphasize a common internal market, implicitly assume constitutional commitments to maintain such conditions. The framers of the constitution were aware of the need to ensure a common market, and Article 301 states: "Subject to the other provisions of this part, trade, commerce and intercourse throughout the territory of India shall be free." Furthermore, according to Article 286: "No law of a state shall impose, or authorize the imposition of the tax on the sale or purchase of goods where such sale or purchase takes place (a) outside the state, or (b) in the course of import of goods into, or export of goods out of, the territory of India."
However, based on the recommendations of the Taxation Enquiry Commission (India, 1953), which noted the problems of tax administration in handling intrastate versus interstate sales, the Sixth Amendment added two clauses to Article 286, enabling the central government to levy taxes on interstate transactions. As argued by Rao, such taxes have been a major source of inefficiency in the Indian economy. 16 In another respect, the constitution has not provided enough durability in its provisions, through its use of escape clauses. The instrumental rationale for constitutions, recall, is the presumption that later incentives for government decision makers will be different (and less socially efficient) than initial incentives, and that these decision makers would choose to bind themselves initially to prevent later changes. In the Indian case, the constitutional escape clauses were more likely to have been motivated by a certain kind of myopia or different perspective on human nature, rather than by any narrow self-interest. Constitution makers such as Jawaharlal Nehru and B. R. Ambedkar saw themselves as benevolent guardians who would continue in that role, or be succeeded by like-minded people-quite far from, for example, James Madison's views at the time of the framing of the US Constitution, warning that men are not angels.
In the above example, the amendment to Article 286 was possible, in spite of Article 301, because Article 302 empowers parliament to impose restrictions on internal trade in the "public interest." Another extremely important example, where a constitutional escape clause was used to engineer major changes in the conduct of the economy, has been the case of center-state transfers. Despite the elaborate constitutional provisions governing such transfers, including the creation of a finance commission, the center used the "miscellaneous provisions" of Article 282 to justify planning commission transfers that became the linchpin of the enormous apparatus of central planning that grew to dominate Indian economic management from the 1950s forward.
Legislation and Administration
While the basis of central planning was in constitutional loopholes, much of the exercise of central government economic control relied on specific laws and administrative regulations. Here the problem was not lack of durability, but the opposite. Despite concerns raised as far back as the 1960s about the basic regime of controls, it was only in the 1990s that any significant changes were made. In terms of the framework of time inconsistency, investment or other economic actions in India were not inhibited by the lack of durability of the laws and rules governing such actions, in a manner that reduced economic efficiency. Indeed, one could argue that economic actors in India operated very efficiently in this context: knowing that the domestic market was protected and regulated, firms, bureaucrats, and politicians behaved accordingly, often making long term investments in things that mattered, such as relationships with politicians, or political careers. The inefficiency was, of course, in the particular laws themselves. 17 How did this inefficiency originate, and why did it persist?
Suppose we adopt the position that particular laws or administrative regulations were efficient when introduced. Why were they not reversed or modified when inefficiencies later became apparent? One possible answer is that enough groups with sufficient political influence were deriving benefits from the system by then to block changes in legislation (Bardhan's "multiple veto system"). 18 Since the period of the 1970s and 1980s was one of rapid growth of subsidies, associated with a government-led development policy, for the interest group view to be consistent with the evidence, one would have to hypothesize increasing participation and effectiveness in the "rent-seeking" process over time.
An alternative view focuses instead on the changing role of political parties. Several researchers have charted the changing position of the once dominant Indian National Congress, with its organizational decay and reduced political influence throughout the country, as a major factor in explaining political instability in India. 19 Chhibber extended this analysis to explain the deepening of "rent-seeking"including the persistence of the laws that make it possible-in terms of the needs of political competition. 20 Essentially, powers of patronage for electoral support became more important in the 1970s and 1980s, overwhelming any concerns about the inefficiency of the system from the perspective of economic growth. Chhibber is able to provide empirical evidence for this proposition by showing that central loans, food assistance, and subsidies to the states were all linked to electoral considerations.
In a similar vein, Kapur and Mehta have argued that large payments were directed by the center in the late 1990s to the states (Andhra Pradesh and Punjab) from which regional parties that were key coalition partners originated. 21 In this case, the support mechanism is direct, to build a majority coalition in parliament after elections, whereas in Chhibber's analysis it derives from the pre-election need to mobilize state-level political resources for national elections. In any case, both Chhibber and Kapur and Mehta emphasize the role of political parties and geographical divides, rather than class interests.
Kapur and Mehta also highlight the role played by the organization of the Indian parliament. Briefly, their analysis traces the decline of parliamentary functioning in ways that reduce oversight for the executive, increase spending, and make legislation more difficult. Measured by annual number of bills passed, the productivity of parliament declined only in the 1990s, whereas it was relatively stable in the previous four decades. 22 As documented in Kapur and Mehta, since the beginning of 1990s, parliament meets for fewer days and fewer hours, with more disruptions caused by disorderly conduct, as well as lower attendance. Quorum requirements often must be ignored in order to conduct business.
Individual members of parliament act chiefly as recipients and distributors of patronage, either directly or as intermediaries, and not as legislators. Major economic reform bills, introduced by reformminded governments, have tended to get stuck in parliamentary standing committees, where the organizational norm of unanimous approval is almost impossible to achieve. From this perspective, therefore, the fact that specific organizational rules within the legislature do not provide incentives for action contributes significantly to the durability of inefficient laws. 23 
Assessment
The perspective of the optimal degree of durability of laws has led to a two-part answer. First, the Indian Constitution has been relatively easy to amend, and also included various escape clauses, permitting the easy passage of legislation that eroded initial intent. This legislation was biased in the direction of a situation that created "vested interests." The inherent difficulty of reversing such legislation has been compounded by the nature of political competition, as well as the internal organization of the main legislative institutions. The presumed consequence of this situation, where inefficient laws are difficult to change, has been the low growth of India relative to its potential, with fast growing East Asian countries providing the benchmark. While there are clearly many other variables that matter in this comparison, the durability of a particular set of laws and administrative rules has presumably played some role, and may be a factor in India's inability to accelerate its growth to the level of countries such as China.
Enforceability
Laws do not make sense without enforcement. In the past, economic models have often taken the enforcement of property rights and other laws affecting economic exchange as fixed or predetermined, and not subject to analysis. Much recent work has focused on analyzing how different enforcement mechanisms and institutions are determined within the political and economic system. Ultimately, enforcement is the responsibility of the police and judiciary, acting in complementary fashion. The police monitor, investigate, and prevent immediate violation where possible. The judiciary examines evidence and rules on innocence, guilt, and punishment. The possibility of punishment acts as a deterrent to violating the law. Social norms and even psychological conditioning matter, in addition to legal institutions, but here we focus on formal institutions.
In practice, in many cases, the police and judiciary do not directly control or enter into the enforcement process. Several examples of alternative enforcement structures exist in India. The most important of these has been the bureaucracy, which has enforced myriad regulations in the realm of industry and trade, simply by its power to say "no." The police and judiciary remain as a back-up, of course, if decisions of administrators are not respected. There has also been a significant overlap between the bureaucracy and the judiciary, in the district magistrate's role accorded to members of the Indian Administrative Service. 24 The Judiciary
This section argues that judicial delays in enforcement and lack of clear enforcement of property rights and contracts are important drags on the Indian economy. The scarcity of resources of the judiciary is a fundamental problem for India. Lengthy delays in deciding cases severely undermine enforceability of laws. One of the most striking features of the state of India's judiciary is the degree of delay. Siwach estimated that by 1980 there were approximately 30,000 cases pending with the Supreme Court, up from about 2,000 twenty years previously, a rate of increase far exceeding the population growth rate. 25 This number increased to over 100,000 by 1991, until, with the Supreme Court's functioning receiving considerable attention, it was brought down in the 1990s, and stood at about 23,000 in 2003. 26 Mookherjee reported data from the Malimath Committee Report, 27 which provided estimates from 1989 that over 1.4 million cases were pending at the High Court level. This figure represented a quadrupling since 1971, again much greater than the growth rate of the population. Recent estimates show a further increase, to over 3 million, with over 20 million cases pending at all levels. 28 Table 5 gives a breakdown of pending cases by High Courts, and indicates two significant points. First, the worst problems are in civil cases, in terms of total numbers (and possibly also length of delay). Second, there are variations across the High Courts, indicating that there are implementation problems as well as systemic issues. We next discuss both these sources of inefficiency.
Mookherjee notes the failure of the number of judges to grow sufficiently quickly over this period, both in terms of total positions and the rate of being filled. 29 The problem of insufficient judicial strength has several causes: "insufficient financial outlays of State governments, lack of proper manpower planning in response to workload increases, and undue exercise of influence by the Executive (i.e., the Home Ministry, the Chief Minister of the concerned state, or the Law Ministry)." 30 The influence is, of course, for the purpose of distributing patronage. He notes the cumbersome procedure for the appointment of judges, which permits this influence to be exercised, and which delays appointments. A further negative consequence of this is the erosion of quality of appointed judges.
Given the number of judges, what also matters for delay is the rate of disposal. Here Mookherjee notes the variation in effective Reductions in delays could also be achieved by reducing the number of cases that have to be considered at this level. Measures to do this include reassigning jurisdictions between lower level and High Courts, better scrutiny of appeal petitions, and the development of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. Siwach, in the context of the Supreme Court, also suggests that ill-drafted legislation is a cause of some of the cases filed.
The effects of delays in the judicial system are manifold. A major economic impact is that they can increase uncertainty as to final resolution and discourage investment. Delays also mean that dispute resolution may become a question of "might is right": using extralegal force to settle a dispute that is stuck in the judicial system becomes attractive, since the use of force itself may not be punished swiftly. This further undermines the credibility of the judicial system.
In practice, the political system often substitutes for the creaky judicial system. Those in political power not only influence the judicial system through patronage appointments, but also take over its functions. Disputes are resolved by each side appealing to different politicians or political factions. Resolution of disputes becomes a function of the relative political influence of the disputants and the relative political strength of the politicians. While the judicial system may also be subject to these effects, and litigation has its own costs, resolution of ordinary legal disputes by political means sacrifices fairness, transparency, and certainty, since there are no rules-only discretion.
A particularly pernicious side effect is that politicians become above the law, since they control its enforcement. Not only are they free to engage in illegal activities without deterrent, but, worse, those who are already lawbreakers have a strong incentive to enter politics. The evidence points to the commonness of these developments in India, with the states of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar leading the way. 31 Furthermore, these effects are self-reinforcing: politicians self-selected by a system that protects them from punishment have an incentive to weaken the judicial system, and the pervasiveness of this norm may affect the number of those who adhere to it. Further impacts on the environment for investment and economic growth can only be negative. 32 The Bureaucracy
Since the Indian bureaucracy has been an important enforcer of laws and regulations, including many involving the conduct of economic activity, its relations with politicians have also been subject to strain. There are direct political pressures on bureaucrats that distort supposedly impartial administrative decision making, as well as incentive mechanisms such as frequent transfers of bureaucrats. Even in the 1950s, transfers were used to reward and punish bureaucrats. 33 In some cases, transfers are a part of an elaborate rent-seeking and rent distribution mechanism, where administrators and politicians may be equally complicit, and which leads to self-selection for the bureaucracy that parallels what we noted is occurring in politics. 34 De Zwart, in providing a comprehensive overview of bureaucratic transfers in India, based on his own fieldwork as well as that of others, 35 notes the theoretical justification as one of reducing corruption by increasing the distance between bureaucrats and their clients. Actual patterns, as documented by de Zwart and others, suggest much greater frequency, variability, and arbitrariness than would be indicated by any such justification. The outcome is that, as in the case of the judiciary, the bureaucracy's role in carrying out administrative policies that are derived from underlying legislative goals (i.e., their part of enforcement) is severely hampered.
To some extent, the problem for the bureaucracy is unavoidable, since in a democracy, it is properly subordinate to the elected representatives of the people. As long as the incentives of politicians are not addressed, there is not much that can be done about providing appropriate incentives to the bureaucracy to carry out their assigned tasks efficiently. This suggests that too much judicial power should not be vested in the bureaucracy, either those such as rural district magistrates, or those who implement and enforce administrative rules and regulations. Such power will always be susceptible to distortion by political influence. On the other hand, there is no reason for the regular judiciary to be as subordinate to the political system as it has become in India. Politicians have come to use their powers of appointment and transfer over the judiciary in heavy-handed ways as well, but this can be changed by appropriate legal reforms and new laws. While politicians will always control the purse strings, within this constraint, the Indian judiciary can be strengthened in ways that will enhance its ability to enforce the law.
The above argument for constraining the bureaucracy more directly, lest it become corrupted-rather than using mechanisms such as transfers, which are themselves corruptible-requires further analysis. Civil servants such as Sivaraman, 31 emphasize the positive role the bureaucracy plays in Indian development: for example, Sivaraman helped initiate the Indian "Green Revolution." Case studies and discussions of the experience of Punjab, the state that was on the leading edge of this revolution, buttress this view with accounts of the positive part played by state-level bureaucrats and technocrats. 36 Some scholars have suggested that well-governed bureaucracies were a positive factor in East Asian growth. 37 In such cases, politicians and bureaucrats seem to have collaborated effectively. 38 In the case of Punjab, one can explain this in terms of politicians having appropriate incentives flowing from their constituents (e.g., middle peasants). In the East Asian case, one would have to appeal to factors beyond electoral pressures.
In contrast to these successful bureaucratic interventions, one is acutely aware of the relative failure of bureaucratic governance in Indian industry and trade. The ex-Soviet Union and its former satellites provide other examples of bureaucratic inefficiency. Shleifer, in discussing these cases and their difficulties of transition from central planning, points to where the differences may lie, in addition to the discipline of the electorate. 39 Shleifer's argument is based on inefficient control structures or property rights, and is as follows.
According to Grossman and Hart, 40 property rights are residual control rights over assets, that is, owners can do what they wish with their assets, as long as it is not forbidden by law. Shleifer further distinguishes between physical and legal rights, with only the latter being protected by the courts. If there is a divergence between the two types of rights, so that bureaucrats or politicians have extensive physical control rights through obstruction, threats, or the like, final allocations after cooperative bargaining to agreement, envisaged as efficient by Ronald Coase, 41 are not enforceable by the courts, and therefore efficient bargains may not be achievable. Interestingly, this enforceability issue is another aspect of the "rules vs. discretion" issue raised in the context of the durability of laws. The argument also extends the earlier discussion of bureaucratic incentives and political pressures.
A focus on property rights suggests a solution to the puzzle of different qualities of bureaucratic interventions. If the scope of bureaucratic control extends too heavily to physical property rights, rentseeking, corruption, and inefficiency are likely results, as discussed by Shleifer and others. However, where bureaucratic interventions are limited to providing public goods (information on new technologies or seed varieties), or correcting externalities (by subsidizing credit or inputs), or doing both (by creating appropriate institutional forms), there is a greater likelihood of positive effects. This perspective seems to fit well with the Indian case, where Green Revolution farmers did not have to get permission to sow more land, or switch crops, whereas industrialists needed bureaucratic approval to expand capacity or switch product lines. 42 The Police
The role of the police is worth considering separately, because it involves the bureaucracy and the judicial system. Ideally, the police should be impartial investigators and monitors, preventing violations of law where possible. Their enforcement role complements that of the judiciary. However, the police are also organized as a bureaucracy under the control of politicians, just as with other branches of administration. The actual functioning of the police in India therefore becomes subject to the kinds of influences discussed above in the context of relations between bureaucrats and politicians. 43 Unlike the case of the bureaucracy in general, reducing the assigned role of the police cannot help, since that would undermine enforcement.
The solution to the problems of enforcement-inconsistency, corruption, uncertainty, delays-may be to strengthen the organizational independence of the police vis-à-vis politicians, but allow greater control by a stronger judiciary. This line of reasoning, while rooted firmly in the concept of "checks and balances" in governance, may seem naïve, for why should the judiciary provide an effective monitor of the police, especially since judges do not have to be responsive to electorates?
One answer might be that a strengthened judiciary, at least at the local level, might be made subject to election, somewhat along the lines of the United States model. Another possibility is that power and prestige may lead to the opposite of short term self-interested behavior. The persistence of the Indian armed forces as an institution with relatively high integrity and efficiency that has not intervened in politics, and yet is not under the direct control of the electorate, is worth considering in this respect. However, the interests of the armed forces are less in conflict with those of politicians than would be the interests of a strengthened judiciary.
Trends in countries such as the United States and Britain suggest an alternative: a greater role for citizens' organizations, in the form of police review commissions, as a direct democratic check on police behavior. However, this would be more effective in dealing with sins of commission, rather than of omission, and would work better at the local level. In the United States in particular, policing is often handled at the local level and local elected officials provide a fairly direct check on the operation of police, ensuring some measure of responsibility and accountability. Some of the pitfalls in local policing in India are similar to those of decentralization in general: lack of resources, training and equity. 44 However, a carefully planned and executed decentralization may overcome some of the current problems created by divergence between the interests of citizens and of individuals engaged in law enforcement. Such decentralization would, of course, have to include attention to the organizational structures within which the police operate. 45 Decentralization is discussed more broadly below.
Assessment
It is fairly unobjectionable to argue that if enforcement of laws in India were improved by being more consistent and swifter, this would have favorable economic consequences. This contrasts with a less straightforward conclusion regarding durability. However, the dimension of enforcement complements that of durability. They are closely related, since nonenforcement amounts to completely nondurable laws, with every new situation requiring a new negotiation. In both cases, two prominent conceptual threads were the issue of rules versus discretion and the nature of rent-seeking activity. The final dimension in our schema, the degree of decentralization, is somewhat different in bringing in questions of geographic scope or span of control.
Decentralization
The issue of the optimal degree or nature of decentralization is crucial in a country the size of India. Issues of durability can also be tied to questions of decentralization, since decentralization allows for experimentation and adaptation in legal frameworks. More directly, enforceability often requires decentralization to a level where monitoring and consequent actions can be more effective. We review a theoretical framework for looking at decentralization in the context of federal governmental structures and principles of assignment of tax and expenditure functions, as well as possible theoretical and empirical links between decentralization and economic performance. Thereafter, we turn to the Indian case, to examine its institutions in the light of the previous discussion.
Design of Federal Institutions
Inman and Rubinfeld, cited previously, provide a conceptual paradigm for evaluating institutions of federal republics. They distinguish between a decentralized "confederate" republic and a "compound" republic, the latter form having an overarching central government capable of acting against local interests. 46 This choice was addressed in the framing of the Indian Constitution, with the final structure relatively centralized, both for reasons of political stability, and for protection of disadvantaged groups such as the "Scheduled Castes" (so named from their constitutional status). For either type of republic, there are two federalist dimensions of its constitution: representation of the constituent units to the central government, and the assignment of governmental tasks between levels of government. Efficient federal institutions involve a preferred combination of representation and assignment.
Representation can be measured by the number and size of the constituent units of the federation. For example, a greater number of smaller units, all of equal size, say, will increase the degree of representation at the center, since there is greater potential for diversity of choices across units. This idea of representation is clearest where there is no layer of state or provincial government, in which case the primary constituent units are parliamentary constituencies. With multiple layers of representative government, each with its own assignments of responsibilities, interpretation is less straightforward. However, comparisons can be made. For example, in the United States, the lower house has one representative for about every 600,000 people, while in India the figure is closer to two million. Therefore, by this measure, the US has a greater degree of representation at the level of the central legislature. Furthermore, the level of representation in India has declined since the constitution was written, since population growth has far outweighed increases in the size of the Lok Sabha. 47 Whether the potential for greater diversity of choices is realized with greater representation depends on the assignment of fiscal functions. In the case of a compound republic, the impact of representation also depends on the institutions that govern the central legislature, since this is where much legislative business will be transacted. 48 These institutions affect the outcome of any particular combination of representation and assignment, measured by the efficiency of public goods provision.
Which form of republic is preferable? The traditional case for a confederate republic is made primarily on non-instrumental grounds, in terms of protecting democratic rights and encouraging political participation, debate, and accommodation. Within a compound republic, the constituent units must have a role to play; otherwise, no federal structure at all would be required. An economic case for local governments can be made based on the idea that interjurisdictional competition can lead to the efficient supply of local public goods. 49 The required conditions (such as mobility of households, full information, and no externalities across jurisdictions) are not easily applied to the Indian economy. The failure of these assumptions to hold may tilt the scales towards centralization.
Inman and Rubinfeld argue for a tradeoff between increased representation, with its democratic advantages, and economic efficiency, impaired by the overspending that accompanies more extensive political representation. The assignment of economic tasks (expenditure and revenue authorities) to different levels of government may provide a way of resolving or softening the tradeoff. How should tasks be assigned? 50 Based on economic efficiency considerations, the brief answer is that the central government should decide where spillovers are significant and/or the goods provided are national, otherwise lower level governments should be assigned the task of provision. Since the central government may have later incentives to alter initial assignments, they are properly fixed in the constitution itself, marking an issue of commitment or durability. In the case of India, this was done in the constitution with separate central, state, and concurrent lists, but again with escape clauses that favored the center in eroding states' authority.
Given a clear assignment of tasks, a level of representation, and legislative institutions, one can compare the economic efficiency of different combinations of these three institutional variables. Inman and Rubinfeld make this comparison based on different types of transactions costs. 51 They straightforwardly conclude that, on grounds of economic efficiency, national public goods should be assigned to the center, with a legislature operating with majority-winning coalitions, while state or other lower level governments should provide lower level public goods. However, intergovernmental transfers with conditions attached can make de facto assignment different from its ostensible manifestation in the constitution or other law.
The optimal assignment of spending responsibilities and authority to impose various taxes does not imply that each government at each level must be in balance. In fact, it is typical for lower level governments to receive transfers from higher level ones. In particular, transfers from the center to the state governments are a strong feature of Indian fiscal federalism. A "vertical" imbalance, between the revenue and spending at different levels of government, may arise simply from differing abilities or efficiencies in tax collection, and the impact of the transfers depends on the incentives that they create or modify. For example, when the revenue goes to one level of government, and collection effort is incurred by another level, the latter's incentives may be weakened.
More generally, intergovernmental grants may be justified as addressing three main objectives: subsidizing specific programs that cross jurisdictions; creating greater equity in the impact of taxes; and equalizing budget capacity across jurisdictions. Conceptually, a designer of a fiscal constitution could maximize the welfare of society by simultaneously assigning tax authorities and spending responsibilities, taking account of how individual governments at each level would respond to this assignment through their levels of spending, taxation, and intergovernmental grants. In practice, the determination of intergovernmental grants is often the result of political considerations. 52 Furthermore, the ability of the central government to make significant categorical grants allows it to substantially affect the direction of lower level government expenditures. Thus, the effective assignment of spending responsibilities becomes determined within an evolving political system, rather than constitutionally, since it is influenced by central government decisions.
An offshoot of the broader "governance and growth" literature considered above extends those concerns specifically to decentralization. Huther and Shah, in a pioneering study that uses cross-country data and their own indices of governance quality, found that there are positive correlations between the proportion of government expenditures that are subnational on the one hand, and measures of citizen participation and government efficiency on the other. Martinez-Vazquez and McNab provide a survey of similar studies, which suggests that, overall, the link between decentralization and growth remains to be established. In part, this reflects some difficulties in measuring the degree of fiscal decentralization in a consistent manner across countries. 53 
Indian Federalism and Governance
The theories discussed earlier in this section provide guidelines for fiscal federal structures, in terms of representation, and assignment of tax authorities and spending responsibilities. In the Indian case these guidelines are not well followed. Assignments of taxation authority are not clear-cut in India, even without considering issues of intergovernmental tax sharing. The central, state, and local governments have overlapping tax assignments, which are uncoordinated. Tax rates across commodities are not set at levels consistent with minimizing the efficiency costs of the taxation associated with resulting price distortions. There are multiple taxes on commodities with cascading effects. Some taxes act as internal tariffs, reducing the advantages of size in India's internal market.
The assignment of spending responsibilities has not been subject to criticisms as severe as those on tax assignment, but the situation in which the states rely considerably on central transfers, either statutory or discretionary, has been a source of problems. Kletzer and Singh have emphasized the political economy of central-state fiscal relations, and suggested that the increased use of discretionary transfers permits greater rent-seeking, or increases resource costs associated with influence activities such as lobbying. 54 Another effect of the tendency for intergovernmental transfers to be discretionary rather than rule-based has been the failure to significantly reduce income inequities across the states through such transfers. 55 This is because discretionary transfers tend to counteract the equalizing effects of formula-based transfers made through the Finance Commission. 56 Since equity is a major reason for centralization (avoiding uncompensated spillovers across jurisdictions being the other), this is an undesirable aspect of the Indian federal fiscal system. Strengthening the Finance Commission, as suggested by Rao, 57 would be one possibility, reducing the problem that the assignment of spending responsibilities becomes determined by the center through the transfer system, rather than respecting the constitutional intent.
Similar issues arise, and to some extent are worse, at the level of state-local interactions. Local government institutions are quite varied. Each state is divided into districts, with further subdivisions (blocks, tehsils or talukas), for administrative purposes. Each subdivision contains a varying number of villages, which form the base of the panchayat system: village, block, and district, each with representative councils at that level. Urban municipalities form a separate system, with grades based primarily on size. Under the constitution, local governments were recognized, but state governments retained statutory control. This changed with the seventy-third and seventy-fourth amendments to the constitution (1993), which gave local government bodies a more independent legal foundation. The Tenth Finance Commission, the first to report after the constitutional change, recognized that this was not sufficient, and explicitly draws attention to the issue of assignment in its report: "Panchayats and urban local bodies need to have well-defined sources of income and taxing powers. They must be encouraged to exploit them to the full, relying on transfers from above only at the margin." This has remained a key flaw in decentralization in India. 58 Potentially, strengthening local government can enhance decentralization in two ways, thus creating greater responsiveness to local preferences, resulting in greater efficiency. First, stronger local capacity provides an easier route for channeling central funds directly to the local level. While this may not seem to get away from the "top-down-ism" that is characteristic of India, it can have two positive effects from the perspective that emphasizes the costs of influence activities such as lobbying. It reduces the number of opportunities for "skimming" funds as they pass through multiple levels of politicians and bureaucrats. Also, the center is less subject to political influence from a locality than from a medium sized or large state. Thus, both these types of influence costs might be reduced. The previous fear was that such bypassing of the state government would be problematic in view of the danger of capture by "traditional rural oligarchs" 59 at the local level. Not only has this danger lessened over the decades since independence, 60 but also it has been demonstrated that coalitions of such oligarchs at the state government level are not necessarily better. 61 The second practical consequence of stronger local government, one more important from the perspective of genuine decentralization and responsiveness, is that such governments may be able to raise funds more effectively. While there are potential economies of scale in raising revenue, the Indian fiscal system has been marked by a greater degree of centralization of revenue raising authority relative to spending responsibilities than in other federations, which has led to what has been termed a "vertical fiscal imbalance." At the center-state level, this has meant that states rely heavily on transfers from the central government to meet their spending responsibilities. This is less true at the state-local level, with 10-20% of urban local governments' funding coming from grants and other transfers. 62 However, while local governments may not rely heavily on external funding, they have an abysmally low level of local public services. Expanding the authority of local governments may help in this regard, and must receive attention, as noted in the quote from the Tenth Finance Commission.
Expanding local budget capacity is not sufficient by itself. Fiscal effort also matters. A property tax, theoretically, distorts resource allocation the least for local government, unlike taxes on other inputs that are geographically much more mobile. However, municipal authorities have been reluctant to use or enforce such taxes effectively. 63 Some of the problems are managerial, including the use of outdated procedures for assessment and collection of such taxes. 64 Tax enforcement, and incentives to restructure taxes may, however, be looked at through the lenses of durability and enforceability discussed above. Thus, without attention to the other aspects of governance highlighted here, decentralization alone will not be enough. Decentralization of authority and enforceability of laws are complementary aspects of governance. Therefore, the functioning of the judiciary, bureaucracy, and police at the local level particularly deserves attention. One approach is to argue that effective local government in these dimensions will require a strengthening of local electoral democracy, something that the seventy-third and seventy-fourth amendments ultimately should make possible. 65 Economic Consequences of India's Institutions of Governance 139
Assessment
Broadly, more effective fiscal and political decentralization, also attending to the durability and enforceability of laws at the local level, will likely benefit India by providing public goods and services more efficiently. Decentralization provides a check on government rentseeking through competition. 66 More importantly, responsiveness and efficiency may be directly promoted by decentralization. At the same time, decentralization must be implemented efficiently: the assignment of powers must restrict the ability of lower level governments to impose distorting taxes or quantitative barriers to interstate trade and movements of capital and labor.
While it is again difficult to quantify the benefits of decentralization in terms of percentage points in the growth rate, one could argue that improvements in health, nutrition, and education are important final goals for development, aside from any economic growth implications they have. Furthermore, primary education positively impacts on growth: Lindert, also using a case study approach, makes this point in comparing pre-and post-independence India to Britain historically, and the Asian Tigers' more recent performance. 67 Finally, decentralization is not the only possible approach: privatization of some aspects of the system may help. 68
Conclusions
This article has focused on the structures of government, and their possible role in affecting economic efficiency in India. After reviewing some of the theoretical and empirical approaches to understanding this issue, I have proposed a conceptual framework that is novel in some respects, focusing on three structural aspects of governance: durability, enforceability, and decentralization. This framework uses methodology similar to that employed by economic historians such as Douglass North, who have looked at such issues across countries and over long time periods, using examples combined with economic reasoning. While definitive conclusions cannot be offered, the discussion provides some indication of where changes in governance institutions might have positive impacts on India's economic performance.
This discussion has been limited to government. In one sense, government is a special case of collective action, which can also include various kinds of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). NGOs (specifically those with nonprofit educational or social missions) may be viewed positively as enhancing social capital and the workings of civil society. Again, there are instrumental and noninstrumental aspects of this perspective. Volunteer organizations, interest groups, social welfare associations, and traditional occupational and religious organizations abound in India. These are often substitutes for lack of effective government: in Delhi, middle class neighborhood residents' associations form to finance and carry out the provision of basic local services such as garbage collection, that should be performed by local government, but either are not done at all, or not done effectively.
However, the economic rationale for government comes from the publicness of public goods, namely, that the consumption of such goods can be shared and that those who are present cannot be excluded from this consumption. These properties imply that voluntary provision will be lower than is efficient, due to the incentive to "free ride" by consuming without paying a share of the costs. Voluntary membership in neighborhood associations at rates of 30-40% (author's estimate) may be less efficient than more effective taxation and public provision of some services. Economies of scale are also relevant in cases such as these. In cases where benefits are measurable, and can be restricted to a well-defined group, self-governance, in areas such as local irrigation institutions, 69 may do well. This can be viewed as a form of specialized local governance, which in turn relies on a system where laws and rules at a broader level are enforced clearly and consistently by government. In either case, these alternative forms of collective action are not a substitute for traditional governance. In this respect, private-public partnerships such as the Bangalore Agenda Task Force may also be promising. 70 Furthermore, issues of accountability and responsiveness arise for nonofficial bodies as well. Laws are enablers of this accountability, making government the key aspect of governance, and resolving the potential "chicken and egg" problem-do we need effective nongovernmental action to ensure a responsive and efficient government? Therefore, the place to start when thinking about institutional reform in India, to complement recent economic reforms that have partly redefined the role of government, may be the quality of the institutions and rule of law, including its durability, enforceability, and reach. NOTES This is a substantially revised version of a paper prepared for the International Law and Economics Conference, New Delhi, sponsored by Project LARGE. I am grateful for the comments of my discussant on that occasion, Marc Galanter, whose own work in this area has been so significant. I am also grateful to Dilip Mookherjee for detailed comments on an early draft, and to Bibek Debroy, Donald Wittman, and Daniel Friedman for helpful conversations and comments. I have benefited most from the critical comments of several anonymous referees. They are blameless for the shortcomings that no doubt remain in my arguments.
